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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

CRAM-DOWN OF THE
UNSECURED CREDITOR:
SECTION 1111(b)(2) RELIEF

tially secured creditors the right to
elect to be treated as having fully
secured claims for reorganization
"Cram-down" is an expression purposes. This election, which
that any creditor would rather not requires approval by more than
hear in a chapter 11 case, but half of the class members in numcould be most disturbing when ber holding at least two thirds of
applied to the partially secured the claims in amount, may not be
creditor. The concern is based on made, however, if the actual colthe fear that the debtor would lateral is of inconsequential value
merely "cash out" the secured or the collateral is sold by the
claim by paying the current value debtor in possession or the trustee
of the collateral at a time when the or is sold pursuant to the reorga2
market with respect to the collat- nization plan.
The
effect
of
Section 1111(b)(2)
eral is temporarily depressed,
best
understood
when considis
thus leaving the undersecured
ered
in
connection
with the recreditor with a sizable unsecured
quirements
for
confirmation
govdeficiency.
erned
by
Section
1129.
Most
Congress reduced this fear of
partially secured creditors by in- chapter 11 plans are confirmed
cluding Section 1111(b)(2) in the pursuant to the acceptance methBankruptcy Code. 1 In essence, od under Section 1129(a). Howthis section gives a class of par- ever, in the event that any class of
claims or interests impaired under
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin & the plan fails to accept it by the
Weintraub & Crames, New York City; minimum percentage of votes, 3
member of the National Bankruptcy Con- the proponent of the plan may reference.
** ProfessorofLaw, Hofstra University quest confirmation by the alterSchool of Law, Hempstead, New York; native method under Section
associated with the law firm of Moritt, 1129(b), commonly called the
Wolfeld & Resnick, Garden City, New
''cram-down.''
York; associate member of the N a tiona!
Bankruptcy Conference.
1 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2). See B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law
Manua/1! 8.18 (1980).

2 11
U.S.C. §§ llll(b)(l)(B)(i), 1111
(b)( l)(B)(ii).
3 See id. § 1126.
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tor loaned $15 million to a debtor
secured by real estate worth $18
million and the value of the real
In addition to the other reestate has dropped to $12 million
quirements for cram-down set
by the date when the debtor filed a
forth in Section 1129(b), the plan
chapter 11 petition. If the creditor
must satisfy the "fair and equitais alone in a class, makes a Secble'' standard with respect to the
tion llll(b)(2) election, and does
dissenting classes in order to qualnot
accept the plan, the plan will
ify for confirmation. 4 A plan is fair
be fair and equitable with respect
and equitable with respect to a
to the secured creditor if it prodissenting class of secured credivides that the mortgage lien will
tors if any one of three alternative
remain on the land to secure the
conditions is satisfied.
entire $15 million debt, the face
The first way is ( 1) to provide
amount of deferred cash paythat class members retain their
ments to be made are at least $15
security interests, whether the
million, and the present value of
collateral is kept or is transferred
the present or deferred payments
by the debtor, to the extent of
is at least $12 million. Because of
their allowed secured claims and
the Section 1111 (b )(2) election,
(2) to give each secured creditor in
the entire $15 million claim is
the class deferred cash payments deemed secured and must be paid
which aggregate to at least the
in full eventually despite the $12
amount of the allowed secured
million value of the collateral.
claim and which have a present
It is easy to see that the Bankvalue equal to the value of the colruptcy Code is designed to prelateral.5
vent the debtor from buying off
This standard is complicated by
the partially secured creditor by
the application of Section 1111
reducing the secured claim to the
(b)(2) of the Code. The meanvalue of the collateral. In order tQ
ing of "allowed secured claim" as
determine the present value of
used in the preceding paragraph
cash payments, the court must
will depend on whether the setake into account the prevailing
cured class makes a Section
interest and discount rates. If the
1111(b)(2) election to be treated
secured creditor does not elect
as fully secured despite the fact
under Section 11ll(b)(2), such
that the collateral may be worth
creditor will not be entitled to the
less than the amount of the claim.
full $15 million in cash payments
For example, assume that a credibecause the total allowed secured
claim will be only $12 million and
the
creditor would be treated as
4 Id. § 1129(b)(J).
s !d. § JJ29(b)(2)(A)(i).
having an unsecured claim to the
The "Fair and Equitable"
Standard
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extent of $3 million. 6 Also, to the
extent that the deferred cash
payments exceed $12 million,
such a nonelecting creditor will be
unsecured in the event of a future
default. 7
A second way of complying
with the fair and equitable standard with respect to a class of dissenting secured creditors is for the
plan to provide for the realization
of the "indubitable equivalent" of
their secured claims. 8 Whether or
not the secured creditor class
makes a Section 1111(b) (2) election, abandoning the collateral to
the creditors or giving them a lien
on similar collateral may satisfy
this standard. The electing class
may not be deprived of the future
appreciation of the collateral
which is the purpose of permitting
such an election. Present cash
payments less than the allowed
secured claim will not be the "indubitable equivalent" of the collateral. Again, if the class makes
an election under Section 1111
(b)(2), the allowed secured claim
must equal the full amount of the
debt, not just the present value of
the collateral. However, unsecured notes or equity securities of
the reorganized debtor will not
constitute the "indubitable equivalent" of the collateral.
See id. § 506(a).
This illustration is based on a similar
one contained in the Congressional Record. See 124 Cong. Rec. H11104 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
8 II U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).
6
7

The term "indubitable equivalent'' derives from Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in In re Murel
Holding Corp. 9 That case involved a plan that provided that a
mortgagee was compelled to forgo
all amortization payments for ten
years. Since the mortgagee had
only a 10 percent margin of value
above the loan balance and had to
take its chances as to the ultimate
value of the property at the end of
the ten-year period, as no provision was made for amortization of
principal, the mortgagee was not
receiving "payment of the most
indubitable equivalence" at the
time of confirmation. It is conceivable that the court could have
held that the "indubitable equivalence" might have been achieved
by granting a lien on other property which was self-liquidating or,
if it were not needed for the debtor's rehabilitation, by a scale of
the property.
The third alternative is to provide in the plan for the sale of the
collateral free and clear of liens
and for the security interest to attach to the sale proceeds. In addition, the security interest in the
proceeds must be treated in accordance with either of the first
two alternatives discussed above
to meet the fair and equitable
standard with respect to the dissenting class of secured creditors.10
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75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).

Io 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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In re Griffiths

An illustration of the application of the cram-down provisions
as applied to the partially secured creditor electing Section
llll(b)(2) may be found in the
recent case of In re Griffiths. 11
The debtors were farmers who
filed petitions under chapter 11 on
August 4, 1982. A month later,
Union State Bank (USB), which
had a security interest in personal
property including machinery,
equipment, livestock, and stored
grain, filed a Section 1111(b)(2)
election and indicated an intention
to reject the proposed plan which
provided for the return of a portion of the collateral together with
a lump-sum payment equal to the
value of the remaining collateral
in total satisfaction of USB's
claim. Since the value of the collateral was less than the $570,670
debt owed to USB, the bank was
undersecured.
The debtor's position in Griffiths was that the combination
of the collateral to be returned to
USB and payment in a lump sum
of the value of the property to be
retained by the debtors as being
"beneficial to the rehabilitative efforts" is the "indubitable equivalent" of the creditor's allowed secured claim. 12 Thus, the debtors
contended that the proposed plan
was "fair and equitable" as
applied to USB, which was in a

class by itself, and the plan could
be confirmed without their acceptance.
After analyzing Sections 1111
(b )(2) and 1129(b)(2)(A), the bankruptcy court rejected the debtors' position and held that the
plan did not offer USB the "indubitable equivalent'' of its allowed secured claim. The court
listed several reasons why the
debtors could not return a portion
of the collateral and pay the value
of the remaining property as a
means of effectuating a cramdown. First, said the court, the
debtors owed USB $570,670, less
the value of any property returned.
The debtors must pay the indubitable equivalent of the remaining
amount owed, and not simply the
indubitable equivalent of the value
of the remaining property. The indubitable equivalent of the claim
must be realized. The post-election
claim is something more than the
value of the remaining property. 13

In many cases a creditor would
not elect under Section 1111 (b )(2)
because it would "be reluctant to
give up the distribution to unsecured creditors under the plan in
exchange for a lien for the full
amount of their secured and unsecured claims." 14 The effect of the
election, however, is to prevent a
"cash-out" since without the
13
14

11
12

27 Bankr. 873 (D. Kan. 1983).
!d. at 875.
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ld. at 876.
Id. This language was quoted from 3

Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice
§ 57.02, at 14-15 (Supp. 1982).
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election the debtors could offer a
plan that would pay the secured
creditor only the value of the
collateral plus a pro rata share
with respect to the unsecured
deficiency. In Griffiths, the debtors were essentially proposing a
cash-out for the bank for the value
of the remaining collateral. ''The
Court cannot agree that a cash out
payment is the indubitable equivalent of a post election claim that
prevented a cash out.' ' 15
The court further observed that
the first alternative way to satisfy
the fair and equitable standard
under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)
(In requires that the proposed
payments to the dissenting electing creditor pass two tests, i.e.,
(1) total payments must at least
equal the/ total claim allowed,
which would be $570,670 less the
returned collateral and (2) the
payments must have a present
value equal to the value of
the collateral. In Griffiths, the
debtors did not propose to pay
the total remaining allowed claim
of the bank but only proposed to
pay the value of the collateral.
"Thus," observed the court,
"under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), the
first requirement of cash payment cram down would not be
satisfied. The Court does not believe § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) was intended as an alternative to the
cash payment requirements of
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)."' 6

The debtors' argument that
they could return all the collateral
·in satisfaction of the post-election
secured ·claim was not contested
by the bank. The debtors argued
that "there is equitably no difference between returning collateral
that could be sold by USB for $X,
or just giving USB $X. " 17 While
the court found the argument to
be "alluring," nonetheless, it still
amounted to a cash-out and was
not the indubitable equivalent of
the electing creditor's claim. For
the reasons stated above, the
court in Griffiths held that the
proposed plan could not be
confirmed without USB's consent
and the debtors were given fifteen
days to modify the plan accordingly.
Conclusion
As illustrated in Griffiths, the
congressional policy that fostered
Section llll(b)(2) was to prevent
the undersecured creditor from
being "cashed out" at the current
market value of its collateral. By
electing under Section 1111 (b) (2),
the claimant sacrifices the right to
participate as an unsecured creditor to the extent of any deficiency
if there is default under the plan,
but gains protection against a
cash-out for less than the amount
of the entire debt owed. This represents a proper balancing of the
interests of the debtor, who needs

rs 27 Bankr. at 876.
/d. at 877.

16

'' Id.
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contiimed possession and use of
the collateral to enable it to be
rehabilitated effectively, and the
partially secured creditor who

[VOL. 16 : 159 1983]

may be unfairly prejudiced by a
cash-out equal to the temporarily
depressed market value of the collateral.

DRIVE-THRU DENTIST

"In East Palestine, Ohio, a dental clinic and a Ford dealership have teamed
up to promote themselves. A dental chair will be put in the auto showroom.
Persons who test-drive a car will get their teeth cleaned free."
-The Wall Street Journal
August 26, 1982
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